We present a graph theoretic approach for watermarking software in a robust fashion. While watermarking typical software that are small in size (e.g. a few kilobytes) may be infeasible through this approach, it seems to be a viable scheme for large applications. Our approach works with program ow graphs and uses some abstractions, approximate k-partitions, and a random walk method to embed the watermark, with the goal of minimizing and controlling the additions to be made for embedding, while keeping the estimated e ort to undo the Watermark (WM) as high as possible. The watermarks are so embedded that small changes to the software or ow graphs are unlikely to disable detection by a probabilistic algorithm that has a secret. This is done by using some relatively robust graph properties, and with some error correcting codes.
Motivation
The problem of software watermarking, at a very basic level, is to insert some data W (the watermark) into a program P, so that in the resulting program P 0 it is not easy to detect and remove the watermark.
To motivate our approach, we look at some toy examples of watermarking schemes and possible attacks against each.
Scheme 1: Let W k be a small piece of W, and let cr(W k ) be an encryption of W k . Suppose we insert W k in the form of an instruction like move RegisterX, cr(W k ) just before another instruction that writes RegisterX. We could insert all pieces W k of W in this manner, distributed at di erent places in the program. However, a simple algorithm that does register ow analysis would discover that the instructions we inserted are dead code, and remove them altogether. Clearly, this scheme of inserting W is not safe to automated attacks. Note that even if W has been somehow encoded in the form of a dummy function W(x) which is called at various places in the program, unless the values returned by W(x) a ects the program variables, a data ow analysis program would detect the redundancy of W(x) and remove it.
Scheme 2: We now modify it so that actual program variables are in some way a ected by W(x). Suppose at some point in P, variables x and z are live, and suppose z is used in instruction I(z). Replace I(z) with the sequence of instructions: y := W(x) t := Encrypt(z,y) /* use y as a key */ z := Decrypt(t,y) I(z) Now, W(x) can be seen to be redundant upon careful visual inspection, but it might be di cult for automated tools to discover this redundancy. Clearly one can think of may other ways of link W tightly with the program P. However, the link between P and W is still weak in the following sense: considering P as a graph, and W as a graph, the function call between P and W is a single-edge cut between the two subgraphs, and an algorithm that looks for such single-edge cuts between regions of the graph P 0 would be able to ag W as a possible candidate for removal.
In fact, there are graph algorithms that can e ciently separate regions of a graph that are weakly connected, where a weak connection may mean small cuts. Moreover, such a graph based attack on the watermark is e ective against any scheme that inserts W in the code/data section, without ensuring that the subgraph W is not weakly connected to the rest of the graph. In other words, any method that attempts to place a WM in the code/data section must contend with attacks that use such automated tools to create a short list of suspected WM locations, which can be isolated with smaller amount of semantic information or human intervention. We propose an algorithm for inserting or embedding a watermark graph W into a program graph P such that the adversary is not at any advantage with automated tools of the type mentioned above, and is thus forced into excessive visual inspection and semantic inference. Note that an attacker can use the semantics by observing the execution and inputoutput behaviour and e ectively re-write the program, removing any WM.
Another attractive feature of the solution, is that provides a tool for Software Tamper Resistance. The goal is to make an executable resist changes to the code (e.g. to remove a license check) without excessive tracing and use of semantics. We do not address the details here, but we beileve a good solution must address both WM and tamper resistance together, which other approaches do not seem to attempt. We mention the general principles but addressing criteria and actual generation of the code that is inserted to meet these principles is beyond the scope of this paper;in practice, this is a signi cant amount of work that is quite important. While making the modi cations to the original code, it is important to preserve the performace, and we note that the usual pro ling and optimizing approaches work with the graph of the programs as well.
Di culties in designing a robust WM
Hiding and recovering the watermark The task of inserting a WM in such a way that it cannot be recovered e ciently calls for some sort of a one-way function on executables, or on their ow graphs. But unlike in cryptography, there are no known ways of de ning plausible one-way functions on these domains. There are basic di culties in accomplishing this. For instance, to design and reason about one-way functions, one must specify the distribution of instances. In cryptography, it is crucial that the instances are random, whereas in our case, the graphs are already generated by some speci c development process, and they cannot be modi ed substantially without degradation of performance. An additional di culty is that the attack algorithms need only be approximate, in a sense that will become clear later. Therefore, the exiibility for generating hard instances for the watermark removal problem is constrained.
Our constructions are graph theoretically motivated and can be seen as a heuristic to hide a WM in a way that would require identifying a speci c cut (or a close approximation to it) among an exponential number of cuts with the same or nearly same graph theoretic parameters. To achieve this, we extract a random-looking graph from the orignal ow graphs, using a k-partition algorithm. In spririt, this is similar to Szemerdi's regularity lemma, which attempts to extract a random looking structures deistel]. The implicit constants for the lemma are truly astronomical and no improvement is possible, although weaker versions of regularity are su cient KF]. Ours is a \poor mans version" of these. Empirically, it appears plausible that such an extraction can be done on relatively large programs. As noted earlier, contending with such cut-based attacks seems necessary for any WM method.
The above discussion indicates that we cannot hope to successfully watermark a small executable without signi cantly increasing its size arti cially. Another problem to contend with is recovery of the WM from an attacked version of the program. We view this problem as designing a function that uses a secret key and returns the same value on a graph even if it is subject to malicious but small alterations.
Local Indistinguishability The added code W (or data) should not be distinguishable from the original payload code P by looking at local properties. For example, there may be more than usual randomized data in a segment, and this can be detected by using tools like Shamir et al]. Alternately, unusual access patterns may be found and exploited in shortlisting suspected watermark locations. Moreover, addition of the WM may also cause local properties to be noticably di erent. We handle this problem heuristically and our way of adding to the executable is to minimize the possibility of inserting any noticeable anamoly.
Some available tools First we would like to point out the existence of tools that take a program binary as input, construct the corresponding control ow graph at some basic block level, and provide an interface that allows transformations to be made to this graph. Some are even available as disassemblers with well de ned interfaces. Such tools, hereafter referred to as graph analyzers, give the adversary the ability to observe and make modi cations without changing its functionality, and can be used successfully for reverse engineering. For example, the Machine-SUIF CFG library ( ?]) provides a Control Flow Graph interface to programs, where nodes are lists of instructions. Similarly, OPTIMIX ( ?]) is a tool that allows tranformations and optimizations in a program through a graph rewrite speci cation. Examples of poweful disassemblers are Sourcer] and Ursoft]. To restate what has been explained above, any watermarking scheme of the future has to be robust to attacks that make heavy use of graph analyzers. Secondly, the algorithms for partition, separator, and cut problems of various avours seem to work quite well in practice for the typical inputs that occur here. Finally we focus on WM for any executable in this paper; knowledge of the domain and typical operations as well as the implementation details can be used to harness the WM and can be used in conjunction with this work.
Previous Work
A comprehensive survey and taxanomy appears in Collberg et al]. Static schemes embed them in code section (code watermarks), or in the data section (data watermarks). While the latter may be relatively easy to recover and remove, code watermarks are more robust and may be encoded in the order of independent instructions, in register use patterns BCS], or control ow layout (e.g., order of C-style case statements or basic block sequence in the program ow graph ( Davidson] ). Many of the methods may be prone to distortive attacks by a graph analyzer, which shu e the crucial order or pattern while maintaining the functionality of the program. For software protection, Sander et al] describes a scheme for hiding a function (implementing an arbitrary polynomial) in the program, where an execution yields encrypted result which a legal user needs to decrypt via a trusted authority; thus illegal users will be unable to proceed further and use the result. We wish to consider detection by an agent or device possessing some secret and no other interventions. We do not address the issue of such agents any further.
Goals and Assumptions
Below, the term program refers to the usual notion of a computer program running on a RAM mcahine. It includes programs in high-level languages such as C, and executable binaries, i.e., programs that are a sequence of machine-speci c instructions. Also, two programs P and P 0 are said to be functionally equivalent if their output is the same for any user-input and the user-interface or the performance does not have any discernible di erence; we allow minor di erences such as in the exact instructions and their order in two programs.
Software Watermarking
A watermarking algorithm E takes as input a program P, a watermark object W, and a random secret key !, and outputs a program P 0 ; in short, E(P; W; !) = P 0 such that P 0 is functionally equivalent to and not much larger than P and there exists an e cient algorithm e that can retrieve W from P 0 given a key, i.e., e(P 0 ; K) = W, where e is called an extractor for the watermark. The key K = f(P; W; P 0 ; !) for some f. (e.g., K = ! could be a key).
Let A denote an adversary that modi es the program P 0 to produce A(P 0 ). (We shall see shortly what we mean by an adversary, and in what ways it may modify a program.) A watermarking algorithm is said to be secure against A if 9 an e cient extractor e such that e(A(P 0 ); K) = W if P 0 = E(P; W; !) for some P; W; ! and e(A(P 0 ); K) = NULL otherwise.
The adversary
Now we consider relevant adversarial models. Based on how the adversary modi es P 0 , we classify it as being either a removing, extracting or a jamming adversary. A removing adversary A r is such that A r (P 0 ) = P 00 , where P 00 and P 0 are functionally equivalent and P 00 in an information theoretic sense has no information about WM. For example, it could be a human agent who is assisted by a powerful tool and examines the entire program P 0 , instruction by instruction, infers the semantics, and writes an equivalent P 00 . Such an adversary can undo any watermark. Our goal is to ensure that A r is the only possible model of an e ective adversary. For notational convenience, we de ne an extracting adversary A e as A e (P 0 ) = W. Finally, the jamming adversary A j modi es the program P 0 so that it is di cult for the watermark extractor e to extract the watermark, even with the secret key K, i.e., A j (P 0 ) = P 00 , where P 0 and P 00 are functionally equivalent programs, yet e(P 00 ; K) 6 = W, for any e cient e. The jamming adversary is the most important model from our point of view, and A in the de nition of a secure watermark in Section 3.1 is assumed to be such an adversary.
We shall assume that a successful attack may be probabilistic, in the sense that it could succeed in undoing the watermark with a high probability, or it may be approximate, i.e., it could undo a signi cant portion of the watermark.
Graph Theory and Watermarking
As noted earlier, we refer to programs by their corresponding ow graphs, where nodes correspond to basic blocks in the program and edges correspond to control ow (jumps and 'fall through's) and function calls. Let the ow graphs of P, W and P 0 be G,W and H respectively. We may describe the process of watermarking as G + W ! H. It merges G and W by adding edges. Addition of edges corresponds to automated ways of inserting code, data and control ow into the programs. We claim two necessary conditions for a good watermarking scheme in this framework:
1. W must be locally indistinguishable from G in H. 2. W must be well connected to G in H.
Condition (1) is explained in Section 1.1, while condition (2) is explained in the next section.
Separation Algorithms
E(G; W), the set of edges between G and W, E(G; W), should be properly chosen so that standard separation algorithms cannot locate it, even approximately.
The Lipton-Tarjan algorithm Lipton-Tarjan], for example, can nd (roughly) equal-sized partitions with a low cut ratio in planar graphs. Other e cient partitioning methods include spectral partitioning ( Spielman et al], Guattery et al]), and multi-commodity ow based methods. Metis ( Metis] ) is a family of programs that uses certain heuristics to nds low cut partitions very e ciently, making the problem of hiding the cut non-trivial.
Hiding a cut in a graph
Our -separation problem is: Given H, partition its nodes into G 0 and W 0 such that at least 1? fraction of nodes of W are in W 0 and at least 1 ? fraction of the nodes of G are in G 0 . The original G; W are not part of the input. Clearly, the separation problem is equivalent to nding the 'right' cut, within a small margin of error. E(P; W; !) therefore must hide the cut so that it is hard to recover. We present a heuristic that hides a cut of size m in H such that it is hard to nd, even approximately, from an information theoretic standpoint.
Embedding the watermark
In this section, we describe how to construct H such that the separation problem is likely to be hard on H. We shall make certain assumptions about G and W and defer the experimental justi cation of some of those assumptions till Section 7.
Algorithm
Given: Program P, watermarking code W, secret keys ! 1 , ! 2 and ! 2 , integer m.
1. Graph step: Compute ow graph G from P. As mentioned earlier, the ow graph has the basic blocks of P as nodes, and edges correspond to either control ow or to function calls. Similarly for W. G and W are both digraphs. 2. Clustering step: Partition the graph G into n clusters using ! 1 as random seed, so that edges straddling across clusters are minimized. Let G c be the graph where each node corresponds to a cluster in G and there is an edge between two nodes if the corresponding clusters in G have an edge going across them. This step produces an undirected graph G c of smaller order. Similarly, W yields W c . 3. Merging step: Here we add edges to and between G c and W c using a random process. Recall that adding an edge between two nodes implies adding an edge between two basic blocks in the original ow graphs, which may be translated using tools into transformations that add code,data and control ow to the programs. The edges are added by a random walk: Assume we are at a node v in say G c . We look at current values of d gg and d gw , the number of nodes adjacent to v in G c and W c respectively. Let p gg = dgg dgg+dgw and p gw = dgw dgg+dgw . We visit next a random node in G c with probability p gw or a node in W c with probability p gg . The choices are made using ! 2 . In this step we add an edge from v to u. We use an analogous method of choosing the next node if we are currently in W c . We repeat this m times. Let H be the resultant graph. 4. Recovery step: Compute a ngerprint of W c -use some robust property of W c , compute its value and encrypt it using secret key ! 3 . We shall discuss shortly which robust properties may be considered.
Discussion
The undirected graphs G c and W c obtained from
Step 2 in the algorithm are found, empirically, to be very similar in structure to the random graph model G n;p , with n nodes and edge probability p
( Bollobas]).
We next examine the e ect of the merging step (3) on the graphs G c and W c . We assume that the edges of E(G c ; W c ), added by the random process in Step 3, are such that we can bound the probability of each edge being present away from 0 and 1 by suitable constants 1 and 2 .
The purpose of the random walk is to yield a better merged graph in terms of local indistinguishability for actual inputs in the presence of real world imperfections of a truly random graph. 
QED.
Thus, even with the knowledge of the correct m (which the adversary may randomly guess), it has little chance of nding a good partition.
Step 4 of the algorithm computes some robust function of W c . Since W c is assumed to be a large random graph, it has several properties that are resistant to minor changes in the graph. For example, if A is the adjacency matrix of W c and d is its diameter, then A d 2 is expected to be robust to a few changes in A. This has empirical evidence for it, which is presented in Section 7. Other properties of the graph, such as the all-pairs minimum s-t cut size, or the path length distribution may also be provably robust, and further investigation is needed on these aspects. As we have stated earlier, this watermarking algorithm may be used in conjunction with any other scheme that exploits semantic or other speci c knowledge about the programs.
Software Tamper Resistance
One important feature of our watermarking approach is its implicit yet strong connection to the problem of software tamper resistance. Informally, tamper resistance refers to the ability of fragments of programs to be resistant to modi cation by an active adversary. Such resistance is usually required in portions of code that make crucial checks pertaining to the validity of relevant software licenses. Since our watermarking approach is based on generating hard instances of the location problem, it may be used to embed crucial checks in the program such that it is hard to locate and hence tamper with them. We believe this to be a positive feature of our approach.
Watermark Recovery 7 Experiments
At the beginning of Section 5.2 we made the assumption that the graphs G c and W c obtained by clustering the corresponding ow graphs are similar in structure to the random graph G n;p , a graph with n nodes where each of the ( n 2) edges is present with a probability p. This assumption is necessary for the analysis to go through, and in Section 7.1 we shall see why the assumption may be justi ed. Later, in Section 7.2, we present experimental evidence that suggests that the medium powers of the adjacency matrix are robust to addition and deletion of a few edges in the graph. This fact is used in
Step 4 of the algorithm in Section 5.1
Random Graph Tests
Let n = number of nodes in G c and m = number of edges. We describe below some tests in support of the hypothesis that G c is very similar to a random graph G n;p , with p = m ( n 2)
. The experimental steps are:
1. Obtain G c corresponding to a large application binary (several Megabytes in size). 2. Pick k vertices of G c at random and let the subgraph of G c induced by V be called a hyperedge.
Since each actual edge in this hyperedge is hypothesized to be present with probability p, the number of actual edges in the hyperedge should follow a binomial distribution b(( k 2); p). Randomly pick N hyperedges as described above, independently, and count the number of hyperedges that have c actual edges, for small values of c. Let the number of hyperedges with c actual edges be denoted by N c , and let the corresponding random variable, which counts the hyperedges with c actual edges in a random graph G n;p be X c . If K = ( Step 1 a large number of times, say T times, to get T samples of the random variable X c .
Compute the observed mean N c and compare it with the expectation E(X c ). We performed the above steps for N = 10000, T = 1000, c = f0; 1; 2g and k = f3; 4; 5; 6g. 
Robust properties
Let A be the adjacency matrix of W c and let d W be its diameter. The hypothesis (see Section 5.1 and Section 6) is that the addition or deletion of a few edges in W c do not cause a big change in A d W 2 . We test this hypthesis on the n-node graph G c , with the underlying assumption being that the same results will hold for W c also. In our experiments, we chose n = 5000, and hence A is a 5000 5000 matrix. The diameter d was found to be 8, which is consistent with the known probabilistic bounds on the diamter of a random graph. ( Bollobas]) We then computed A d=2 , made some random additions and deletions to W c and recomputed A d=2 . It was found that typically about 0:001% of the entries in this matrix had changed values, which implies that the matrix is robust to changes in the graph.
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